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Abstract
Bayesian optimization is a powerful tool for fine-
tuning the hyper-parameters of a wide variety of
machine learning models. The success of ma-
chine learning has led practitioners in diverse
real-world settings to learn classifiers for prac-
tical problems. As machine learning becomes
commonplace, Bayesian optimization becomes
an attractive method for practitioners to automate
the process of classifier hyper-parameter tuning.
A key observation is that the data used for tun-
ing models in these settings is often sensitive.
Certain data such as genetic predisposition, per-
sonal email statistics, and car accident history, if
not properly private, may be at risk of being in-
ferred from Bayesian optimization outputs. To
address this, we introduce methods for releas-
ing the best hyper-parameters and classifier ac-
curacy privately. Leveraging the strong theoreti-
cal guarantees of differential privacy and known
Bayesian optimization convergence bounds, we
prove that under a GP assumption these private
quantities are also near-optimal. Finally, even if
this assumption is not satisfied, we can use dif-
ferent smoothness guarantees to protect privacy.
1. Introduction
Machine learning is increasingly used in application areas
with sensitive data. For example, hospitals use machine
learning to predict if a patient is likely to be readmitted
soon (Yu et al., 2013), webmail providers classify spam
emails from non-spam (Weinberger et al., 2009), and in-
surance providers forecast the extent of bodily injury in car
crashes (Chong et al., 2005).
In these scenarios data cannot be shared legally, but compa-
nies and hospitals may want to share hyper-parameters and
validation accuracies through publications or other means.
However, data-holders must be careful, as even a small
amount of information can compromise privacy.
Which hyper-parameter setting yields the highest accuracy
can reveal sensitive information about individuals in the
validation or training data set, reminiscent of reconstruc-
tion attacks described by Dwork & Roth (2013) and Dinur
& Nissim (2003). For example, imagine updated hyper-
parameters are released right after a prominent public fig-
ure is admitted to a hospital. If a hyper-parameter is known
to correlate strongly with a particular disease the patient is
suspected to have, an attacker could make a direct correla-
tion between the hyper-parameter value and the individual.
To prevent this sort of attack, we develop a set of algorithms
that automatically fine-tune the hyper-parameters of a ma-
chine learning algorithm while provably preserving differ-
ential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b). Our approach lever-
ages recent results on Bayesian optimization (Snoek et al.,
2012; Hutter et al., 2011; Bergstra & Bengio, 2012; Gard-
ner et al., 2014), training a Gaussian process (GP) (Ras-
mussen & Williams, 2006) to accurately predict and max-
imize the validation gain of hyper-parameter settings. We
show that the GP model in Bayesian optimization allows
us to release noisy final hyper-parameter settings to protect
against aforementioned privacy attacks, while only sacri-
ficing a tiny, bounded amount of validation gain.
Our privacy guarantees hold for releasing the best hyper-
parameters and best validation gain. Specifically our con-
tributions are as follows:
• We derive, to the best of our knowledge, the first
framework for Bayesian optimization with provable
differential privacy guarantees,
• We develop variations both with and without observa-
tion noise, and
• We show that even if our validation gain is not drawn
from a Gaussian process, we can guarantee differen-
tial privacy under different smoothness assumptions.
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Differentially Private Bayesian Optimization
We begin with background on Bayesian optimization and
differential privacy we will use to prove our guarantees.
2. Background
In general, our aim will be to protect the privacy of a val-
idation dataset of sensitive records V ⊆ X (where X is
the collection of all possible records) when the results of
Bayesian optimization depends on V .
Bayesian optimization. Our goal is to maximize an un-
known function fV : Λ → R that depends on some valida-
tion dataset V ⊆ X :
max
λ∈Λ
fV(λ). (1)
It is important to point out that all of our results hold for the
general setting of eq. (1), but throughout the paper, we use
the vocabulary of a common application: that of machine
learning hyper-parameter tuning. In this case fV(λ) is the
gain of a learning algorithm evaluated on validation dataset
V that was trained with hyper-parameters λ ∈ Λ ⊆ Rd.
As evaluating fV is expensive (e.g., each evaluation re-
quires training a learning algorithm), Bayesian optimiza-
tion gives a procedure for selecting a small number of loca-
tions to sample fV : [λ1, . . . , λT ] = λT ∈ Rd×T . Specif-
ically, given a current sample λt, we observe a valida-
tion gain vt such that vt = fV(λt) + αt, where αt ∼
N (0, σ2) is Gaussian noise with possibly non-zero vari-
ance σ2. Then, given vt and previously observed values
v1, . . . , vt−1, Bayesian optimization updates its belief of
fV and samples a new hyper-parameter λt+1. Each step of
the optimization proceeds in this way.
To decide which hyper-parameter to sample next, Bayesian
optimization places a prior distribution over fV and updates
it after every (possibly noisy) function observation. One
popular prior distribution over functions is the Gaussian
process GP(µ(·), k(·, ·)) (Rasmussen & Williams, 2006),
parameterized by a mean function µ(·) (we set µ = 0,
w.l.o.g.) and a kernel covariance function k(·, ·). Functions
drawn from a Gaussian process have the property that any
finite set of values of the function are normally distributed.
Additionally, given samples λT = [λ1, . . . , λT ] and ob-
servations vT = [v1, . . . , vT ], the GP posterior mean and
variance has a closed form:
µT (λ) = k(λ,λT )(KT + σ
2I)−1vT
kT (λ, λ
′) = k(λ, λ′)− k(λ,λT )(KT + σ2I)−1k(λT , λ′)
σ2T (λ) = kT (λ, λ), (2)
where k(λ,λT )∈R1×T is evaluated element-wise on each
of the T columns of λT . As well, KT = k(XT ,XT ) ∈
RT×T and λ ∈ Λ is any hyper-parameter. As more sam-
ples are observed, the posterior mean function µT (λ) ap-
proaches fV(λ).
One well-known method to select hyper-parameters λmax-
imizes the upper-confidence bound (UCB) of the posterior
GP model of fV (Auer et al., 2002; Srinivas et al., 2010):
λt+1 , arg max
λ∈Λ
µt(λ) +
√
βt+1σt(λ), (3)
where βT+1 is a parameter that trades off the exploita-
tion of maximizing µt(λ) and the exploration of maximiz-
ing σt(λ). Srinivas et al. (2010) proved that given cer-
tain assumptions on fV and fixed, non-zero observation
noise (σ2 > 0), selecting hyper-parameters λ to maximize
eq. (3) is a no-regret Bayesian optimization procedure:
limT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 fV(λ
∗) − fV(λt) = 0, where fV(λ∗) is
the maximizer of eq. (1). For the no-noise setting, de Fre-
itas et al. (2012) give a UCB-based no-regret algorithm.
Contributions. Alongside maximizing fV , we would
like to guarantee that if fV depends on (sensitive) valida-
tion data, we can release information about fV so that the
data V remains private. Specifically, we may wish to re-
lease (a) our best guess λˆ , arg maxt≤T fV(λt) of the true
(unknown) maximizer λ∗ and (b) our best guess fV(λˆ) of
the true (also unknown) maximum objective fV(λ∗). The
primary question this work aims to answer is: how can we
release private versions of λˆ and fV(λˆ) that are close to
their true values, or better, the values λ∗ and fV(λ∗)? We
give two answers to these questions. The first will make
a Gaussian process assumption on fV , which we describe
immediately below. The second, described in Section 5,
will utilize Lipschitz and convexity assumptions to guaran-
tee privacy in the event the GP assumption does not hold.
Setting. For our first answer to this question, let us de-
fine a Gaussian process over hyper-parameters λ, λ′ ∈ Λ
and datasets V,V ′ ⊆ X as follows: GP(0, k1(V,V ′) ⊗
k2(λ, λ
′)
)
. A prior of this form is known as a multi-task
Gaussian process (Bonilla et al., 2008). Many choices for
k1 and k2 are possible. The function k1(V,V ′) defines a
set kernel (e.g., a function of the number of records that
differ between V and V ′). For k2, we focus on either the
squared exponential: k2(λ, λ′) = exp
(−‖λ− λ′‖22/(2`2))
or Mate´rn kernels: (e.g., for ν = 5/2, k2(λ, λ′) = (1 +√
5r/`+ (5r2)/(3`2)) exp(−√5r/`), for r = ‖λ− λ′‖2),
for a fixed `, as they have known bounds on the maximum
information gain (Srinivas et al., 2010). Note that as de-
fined, the kernel k2 is normalized (i.e., k2(λ, λ) = 1).
Assumption 1. We have a problem of type (1), where
all possible dataset functions [f1, . . . , f2|X| ] are GP dis-
tributed GP(0, k1(V,V ′) ⊗ k2(λ, λ′)) for known kernels
k1, k2, for all V,V ′⊆X and λ, λ′∈Λ, where |Λ|≤∞.
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Similar Gaussian process assumptions have been made in
previous work (Srinivas et al., 2010). For a result in the no-
noise observation setting, we will make use of the assump-
tions of de Freitas et al. (2012) for our privacy guarantees,
as described in Section 4.
2.1. Differential Privacy
One of the most widely accepted frameworks for private
data release is differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006b),
which has been shown to be robust to a variety of privacy
attacks (Ganta et al., 2008; Sweeney, 1997; Narayanan &
Shmatikov, 2008). Given an algorithm A that outputs a
value λ when run on dataset V , the goal of differential pri-
vacy is to ‘hide’ the effect of a small change in V on the
output of A. Equivalently, an attacker should not be able
to tell if a private record was swapped in V just by looking
at the output of A. If two datasets V,V ′ differ by swap-
ping a single element, we will refer to them as neighboring
datasets. Note that any non-trivial algorithm (i.e., an algo-
rithm A that outputs different values on V and V ′ for some
pair V,V ′ ⊆ X ) must include some amount of randomness
to guarantee such a change in V is unobservable in the out-
put λ of A (Dwork & Roth, 2013). The level of privacy
we wish to guarantee decides the amount of randomness
we need to add to λ (better privacy requires increased ran-
domness). Formally, the definition of differential privacy is
stated below.
Definition 1. A randomized algorithm A is (, δ)-
differentially private for , δ ≥ 0 if for all λ ∈ Range(A)
and for all neighboring datasets V,V ′ (i.e., such that V and
V ′ differ by swapping one record) we have that
Pr
[A(V) = λ] ≤ e Pr[A(V ′) = λ]+ δ. (4)
The parameters , δ guarantee how privateA is; the smaller,
the more private. The maximum privacy is  = δ = 0 in
which case eq. (4) holds with equality. This can be seen by
the fact that V and V ′ can be swapped in the definition, and
thus the inequality holds in both directions. If δ = 0, we
say the algorithm is simply -differentially private. For a
survey on differential privacy we refer the interested reader
to Dwork & Roth (2013).
There are two popular methods for making an algorithm -
differentially private: (a) the Laplace mechanism (Dwork
et al., 2006b), in which we add random noise to λ and (b)
the exponential mechanism (McSherry & Talwar, 2007),
which draws a random output λ˜ such that λ˜ ≈ λ. For
each mechanism we must define an intermediate quan-
tity called the global sensitivity describing how much A
changes when V changes.
Definition 2. (Laplace mechanism) The global sensitivity
of an algorithmA over all neighboring datasets V,V ′ (i.e.,
V,V ′ differ by swapping one record) is
∆A , maxV,V′⊆X ‖A(V)−A(V
′)‖1.
(Exponential mechanism) The global sensitivity of a func-
tion q :X×Λ→R over all neighboring datasets V,V ′ is
∆q , maxV,V′⊆X
λ∈Λ
‖q(V, λ)− q(V ′, λ)‖1.
The Laplace mechanism hides the output of A by perturb-
ing its output with some amount of random noise.
Definition 3. Given a dataset V and an algorithm A, the
Laplace mechanism returns A(V) + ω, where ω is a noise
variable drawn from Lap(∆A/), the Laplace distribution
with scale parameter ∆A/ (and location parameter 0).
The exponential mechanism draws a slightly different λ˜
that is ‘close’ to λ, the output of A.
Definition 4. Given a dataset V and an algorithm
A(V) = arg maxλ∈Λ q(V, λ), the exponential mecha-
nism returns λ˜, where λ˜ is drawn from the distribution
1
Z exp
(
q(V, λ)/(2∆q)
)
, and Z is a normalizing constant.
Given Λ, a possible set of hyper-parameters, we derive
methods for privately releasing the best hyper-parameters
and the best function values fV , approximately solving
eq. (1). We first address the setting with observation noise
(σ2 > 0) in eq. (2) and then describe small modifications
for the no-noise setting. For each setting we use the UCB
sampling technique in eq. (3) to derive our private results.
3. With observation noise
In general cases of Bayesian optimization, observation
noise occurs in a variety of real-world modeling settings
such as sensor measurement prediction (Krause et al.,
2008). In hyper-parameter tuning, noise in the validation
gain may be as a result of noisy validation or training fea-
tures.
In the sections that follow, although the quantities f, µ, σ, v
all depend on the validation dataset V , for notational sim-
plicity we will occasionally omit the subscript V . Similarly,
for V ′ we will often write: f ′, µ′, σ′2, v′.
3.1. Private near-maximum hyper-parameters
In this section we guarantee that releasing λ˜ in Algorithm
1 is private (Theorem 1) and that it is near-optimal (The-
orem 2). Our proof strategy is as follows: we will first
demonstrate the global sensitivity of µT (λ) with probabil-
ity at least 1−δ. Then we will show show that releasing λ˜
via the exponential mechanism is (, δ)-differentially pri-
vate. Finally, we prove that µT (λ˜) is close to f(λ∗), the
true maximizer of eq. (1).
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Algorithm 1 Private Bayesian Opt. (noisy observations)
Input: V; Λ ⊆ Rd; T ; (, δ); σ2V,0; γT
µV,0 = 0
for t = 1 . . . T do
βt=2 log(|Λ|t2pi2/(3δ))
λt , arg maxλ∈Λ µV,t−1(λ) +
√
βtσV,t−1(λ)
Observe validation gain vV,t, given λt
Update µV,t and σ2V,t according to (2)
end for
c=2
√(
1−k(V,V ′)) log (3|Λ|/δ)
q=σ
√
4 log(3/δ)
C1 = 8/ log(1 + σ
−2)
Draw λ˜ ∈ Λ w.p. Pr[λ] ∝ exp
(
µV,T (λ)
2(2
√
βT+1+c)
)
v∗=maxt≤T vV,t
Draw θ ∼Lap
[√
C1βT γT

√
T
+ c +
q

]
v˜ = v∗ + θ
Return: λ˜, v˜
Global sensitivity. As a first step we bound the global
sensitivity of µT (λ) as follows:
Theorem 1. Given Assumption 1, for any two neighboring
datasets V,V ′ and for all λ ∈ Λ with probability at least
1 − δ there is an upper bound on the global sensitivity (in
the exponential mechanism sense) of µT :
|µ′T (λ)− µT (λ)| ≤ 2
√
βT+1 + σ1
√
2 log (3|Λ|/δ),
for σ1 =
√
2
(
1−k1(V,V ′)
)
, βt=2 log
(
|Λ|t2pi2/(3δ)
)
.
Proof. Note that, by applying the triangle inequality twice,
for all λ ∈ Λ,
|µ′T (λ)− µT (λ)| ≤ |µ′T (λ)− f ′(λ)|+ |f ′(λ)− µT (λ)|
≤ |µ′T (λ)− f ′(λ)|+ |f ′(λ)− f(λ)|+ |f(λ)− µT (λ)|.
We can now bound each one of the terms in the summation
on the right hand side (RHS) with probability at least δ3 .
According to Srinivas et al. (2010), Lemma 5.1, we obtain
|µ′T (λ)−f ′(λ)|≤
√
βT+1σ
′
T (λ). The same can be applied
to |f(λ) − µT (λ)|. As σ′T (λ) ≤ 1, because k(λ, λ) = 1,
we can upper bound both terms by 2
√
βT+1. In order to
bound the remaining (middle) term on the RHS recall that
for a random variable Z∼N (0, 1) we have: Pr[|Z|>γ]≤
e−γ
2/2. For variables Z1, . . . Zn ∼ N (0, 1), we have, by
the union bound, that Pr
[∀i, |Zi| ≤ γ] ≥ 1 − ne−γ2/2 ,
1 − δ3 . If we set Z = |f(λ)−f
′(λ)|
σ1
and n= |Λ|, we obtain
γ=
√
2 log
(
3|Λ|/δ), which completes the proof. 
We remark that all of the quantities in Theorem 1 are either
given or selected by the modeler (e.g, δ, T ). Given this
upper bound we can apply the exponential mechanism to
release λ˜ privately, as per Definition 1:
Corollary 1. Let A(V) denote Algorithm 1 applied on
dataset V . Given Assumption 1, λ˜ is (, δ)-differentially
private, i.e., Pr
[A(V)= λ˜]≤e Pr[A(V ′)= λ˜]+δ, for any
pair of neighboring datasets V,V ′.
We leave the proof of Corollary 1 to the supplementary
material. Even though we must release a noisy hyper-
parameter setting λ˜, it is in fact near-optimal.
Theorem 2. Given Assumption 1 the following near-
optimal approximation guarantee for releasing λ˜ holds:
µT (λ˜) ≥ f(λ∗)− 2
√
βT − q − 2∆ (log |Λ|+ a)
w.p. ≥ 1− (δ+ e−a), where ∆ = 2√βT+1 + c (for βT+1,
c, and q defined as in Algorithm 1).
Proof. In general, the exponential mechanism selects λ˜ that
is close to the maximum λ (McSherry & Talwar, 2007):
µT (λ˜) ≥ maxλ∈Λ µT (λ)− 2∆ (log |Λ|+ a), (5)
with probability at least 1− e−a. Recall we assume that at
each optimization step we observe noisy gain vt = f(λt)+
αt, where αt ∼ N (0, σ2) (with fixed noise variance σ2 >
0). As such, we can lower bound the term maxλ∈Λ µT (λ):
max
λ∈Λ
µT (λ) ≥ f(λT ) + αT︸ ︷︷ ︸
vT
f(λ∗)−max
λ∈Λ
µT (λ) ≤ f(λ∗)− f(λT ) + αT
f(λ∗)−max
λ∈Λ
µT (λ) ≤ 2
√
βTσT−1(λT ) + αT
max
λ∈Λ
µT (λ) ≥ f(λ∗)− 2
√
βT + αT , (6)
where the third line follows from Srinivas et al. (2010):
Lemma 5.2 and the fourth line from the fact that
σT−1(λT ) ≤ 1.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, given a normal random vari-
ableZ∼N (0, 1) we have: Pr[|Z|≤γ]≥1−e−γ2/2 := 1−δ2 .
Therefore if we set Z = αTσ we have γ =
√
2 log(2/δ).
This implies that |αT |≤σ
√
2 log(2/δ)≤√4 log(3/δ)=q
(as defined in Algorithm 1) with probability at least 1− δ2 .
Thus, we can lower bound αT by −q. We can then lower
bound maxλ∈Λ µT (λ) in eq. (5) with the right hand side
of eq. (6). Therefore, given the βT in Algorithm 1, Srini-
vas et al. (2010), Lemma 5.2 holds with probability at least
1− δ2 and the theorem statement follows. 
3.2. Private near-maximum validation gain
In this section we demonstrate releasing the validation gain
v˜ in Algorithm 1 is private (Theorem 3) and that the noise
we add to ensure privacy is bounded with high probability
(Theorem 4). As in the previous section our approach will
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be to first derive the global sensitivity of the maximum v
found by Algorithm 1. Then we show releasing v˜ is (, δ)-
differentially private via the Laplace mechanism. Perhaps
surprisingly, we also show that v˜ is close to f(λ∗).
Global sensitivity. We bound the global sensitivity of the
maximum v found with Bayesian optimization and UCB:
Theorem 3. Given Assumption 1, and neighboring V,V ′,
we have the following global sensitivity bound (in the
Laplace mechanism sense) for the maximum v, w.p. ≥1−δ
|max
t≤T
v′t −max
t≤T
vt| ≤
√
C1βT γT√
T
+ c+ q.
where the maximum Gaussian process information gain γT
is bounded above for the squared exponential and Mate´rn
kernels (Srinivas et al., 2010).
Proof. For notational simplicity let us denote the regret
term as Ω ,
√
C1TβT γT . Then from Theorem 1 in Srini-
vas et al. (2010) we have that
Ω
T
≥ f(λ∗)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
f(λt) ≥ f(λ∗)−max
t≤T
f(λt). (7)
This implies f(λ∗) ≤ maxt≤T f(λt) + ΩT with probability
at least 1− δ3 (with appropriate choice of βT ).
Recall that in the proof of Theorem 1 we showed that
|f(λ) − f ′(λ)| ≤ c with probability at least 1 − δ3 (for
c given in Algorithm 1). This along with the above ex-
pression imply the following two sets of inequalities with
probability greater than 1− 2δ3 :
f ′(λ∗)− c ≤ f(λ∗) < max
t≤T
f(λt) +
Ω
T ;
f(λ∗)− c ≤ f ′(λ∗) < max
t≤T
f ′(λt) + ΩT .
These, in turn, imply the two sets of inequalities:
max
t≤T
f ′(λt) ≤ f ′(λ∗) < max
t≤T
f(λt) +
Ω
T + c;
max
t≤T
f(λt) ≤ f(λ∗) < max
t≤T
f ′(λt) + ΩT + c.
This implies |maxt≤T f ′(λt) −maxt≤T f(λt)| ≤ ΩT + c.
That is, the global sensitivity of maxt≤T f(λt) is bounded.
Given the sensitivity of the maximum f , we can readily
derive the sensitivity of maximum v. First note that we can
use the triangle inequality to derive
|max
t≤T
v′(λt)−max
t≤T
v(λt)| ≤ |max
t≤T
v(λt)−max
t≤T
f(λt)|
+ |max
t≤T
v′(λt)−max
t≤T
f ′(λt)|
+ |max
t≤T
f ′(λt)−max
t≤T
f(λt)|.
We can immediately bound the final term on the right hand
side. Note that as vt = f(λt) + αt, the first two terms are
bounded above by |α| and |α′|, where α = {αdte | dte ,
arg maxt≤T |αt|} (similarly for α′). This is because, in
the worst case, the observation noise shifts the observed
maximum maxt≤T vt up or down by α. Therefore, let αˆ =
α if |α| > |α′| and αˆ = α′ otherwise, so that we have:
|max
t≤T
v′(λt)−max
t≤T
v(λt)| ≤ ΩT + c+ |2αˆ|.
Although |αˆ| can be arbitrarily large, recall that for Z ∼
N (0, 1) we have: Pr[|Z| ≤ γ] ≥ 1 − e−γ2/2 , 1 − δ3 .
Therefore if we set Z = 2αˆ
σ
√
2
we have γ =
√
2 log(3/δ).
This implies that |2αˆ| ≤ σ√4 log(3/δ) = q with probabil-
ity at least 1 − δ3 . Therefore, if Theorem 1 from Srinivas
et al. (2010) and the bound on |f(λ)− f ′(λ)| hold together
with probability at least 1− 2δ3 as described above, the the-
orem follows directly. 
As in Theorem 1 each quantity in the above bound is given
in Algorithm 1 (β, c, q), given in previous results (Srinivas
et al., 2010) (γT , C1) or specified by the modeler (T , δ).
Now that we have a bound on the sensitivity of the max-
imum v we will use the Laplace mechanism to prove our
privacy guarantee (proof in supplementary material):
Corollary 2. Let A(V) denote Algorithm 1 run on dataset
V . Given Assumption 1, releasing v˜ is (, δ)-differentially
private, i.e., Pr[A(V)= v˜]≤e Pr[A(V ′)= v˜]+δ.
Further, as the Laplace distribution has exponential tails,
the noise we add to obtain v˜ is not too large:
Theorem 4. Given the assumptions of Theorem 1, we have
the following bound,
|v˜ − f(λ∗)| ≤√2 log(2T/δ) + ΩT + a( ΩT + c + q),
with probability at least 1−(δ+e−a) for Ω = √C1TβT γT .
Proof (Theorem 4). Let Z be a Laplace random variable
with scale parameter b and location parameter 0; Z ∼
Lap(b). Then Pr
[|Z| ≤ ab] = 1 − e−a. Thus, in Al-
gorithm 1, |v˜−maxt≤T vt| ≤ ab for b = ΩT + c + q with
probability at least 1− e−a. Further observe,
ab ≥ max
t≤T
vt − v˜ ≥ (max
t≤T
f(λt)−max
t≤T
|αt|)− v˜
≥ f(λ∗)− ΩT −maxt≤T |αt| − v˜ (8)
where the second and third inequality follow from the
proof of Theorem 3 (using the regret bound of Srinivas
et al. (2010): Theorem 1). Note that the third inequal-
ity holds with probability greater than 1 − δ2 (given βt in
Algorithm 1). The final inequality implies f(λ∗) − v˜ ≤
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maxt≤T |αt|+ ΩT + ab. Also note that,
ab ≥ v˜ −max
t≤T
vt ≥ v˜ − (max
t≤T
f(λt) + max
t≤T
|αt|)
≥ v˜ − f(λ∗)− ΩT −maxt≤T |αt| (9)
This implies that f(λ∗) − v˜ ≥ −maxt≤T |αt| − ΩT − ab.
Thus we have that |v˜−f(λ∗)| ≤ maxt≤T |αt|+ ΩT +ab. Fi-
nally, because |αt| could be arbitrarily large we give a high
probability upper bound on |αt| for all t. Recall that for
Z1, . . . Zn ∼ N (0, 1) we have by the tail probability bound
and union bound that Pr
[∀t, |Zt| ≤ γ]≥ 1 − ne−γ2/2 ,
1− δ2 . Therefore, if we set Zt = αt and n = T , we obtain
γ=
√
2 log(2T/δ). As defined γ ≥ maxt≤T |αt|. 
We note that, because releasing either λ˜ or v˜ is (, δ)-
differentially private, by Corollaries 1 and 2, releasing
both private quantities in Algorithm 1 guarantees (2, 2δ)-
differential privacy for validation dataset V . This is due
to the composition properties of (, δ)-differential privacy
(Dwork et al., 2006a) (in fact stronger composition results
can be demonstrated, (Dwork & Roth, 2013)).
4. Without observation noise
In hyper-parameter tuning it may be reasonable to assume
that we can observe function evaluations exactly: vV,t =
fV(λt). First note that we can use the same algorithm to
report the maximum λ in the no-noise setting. Theorems 1
and 2 still hold (note that q = 0 in Theorem 2). However,
we cannot readily report a private maximum f as the infor-
mation gain γT in Theorems 3 and 4 approaches infinity as
σ2 → 0. Therefore, we extend results from the previous
section to the exact observation case via the regret bounds
of de Freitas et al. (2012). Algorithm 2 demonstrates how
to privatize the maximum f in the exact observation case.
Algorithm 2 Private Bayesian Opt. (noise free obs.)
Input: V; Λ ⊆ Rd; T ; (, δ); A, τ ; assumptions on fV
in de Freitas et al. (2012)
Run method of de Freitas et al. (2012), resulting in noise
free observations: fV(λ1), . . . , fV(λT )
c = 2
√(
1− k(V,V ′)) log(2|Λ|/δ)
Draw θ ∼ Lap
[
A
 e
− 2τ
(log 2)d/4 + c
]
Return: f˜ = max2≤t≤T fV(λt) + θ
4.1. Private near-maximum validation gain
We demonstrate that releasing f˜ in Algorithm 2 is private
(Theorem 3) and that a small amount of noise is added to
make f˜ private (Theorem 6). To do so, we derive the global
sensitivity of max2≤t≤T f(λt) in Algorithm 2 independent
of the maximum information gain γT via de Freitas et al.
(2012). Then we prove releasing f˜ is (, δ)-differentially
private and that f˜ is almost max2≤t≤T f(λt).
Global sensitivity. The following Theorem gives a
bound on the global sensitivity of the maximum f .
Theorem 5. Given Assumption 1 and the assumptions
in Theorem 2 of de Freitas et al. (2012), for neighbor-
ing datasets V,V ′ we have the following global sensitivity
bound (in the Laplace mechanism sense),
| max
2≤t≤T
f ′(λt)− max
2≤t≤T
f(λt)| ≤ Ae−
2τ
(log 2)d/4 + c
w.p. at least 1− δ for c=2
√(
1−k(V,V ′)) log(2|Λ|/δ).
We leave the proof to the supplementary material.
Given this sensitivity, we may apply the Laplace mecha-
nism to release f˜ .
Corollary 3. Let A(V) denote Algorithm 2 run on dataset
V . Given assumption 1 and that f satisfies the assumptions
of de Freitas et al. (2012), f˜ is (, δ)-differentially private,
with respect to any neighboring dataset V ′, i.e.,
Pr
[A(V) = f˜] ≤ e Pr[A(V ′) = f˜]+ δ.
Even though we must add noise to the maximum f we show
that f˜ is still close to the optimal f(λ∗).
Theorem 6. Given the assumptions of Theorem 3, we have
the utility guarantee for Algorithm 2:
|f˜ − f(λ∗)| ≤ Ω + a
(
Ω
 +
c

)
w.p. at least 1−(δ + e−a) for Ω=Ae−
2τ
(log 2)d/4 .
We prove Corollary 3 and Theorem 6 in the supplementary
material. We have demonstrated that in the noisy and noise-
free settings we can release private near-optimal hyper-
parameter settings λ˜ and function evaluations v˜, f˜ . How-
ever, the analysis thus far assumes the hyper-parameter set
is finite: |Λ|<∞. It is possible to relax this assumption,
using an analysis similar to (Srinivas et al., 2010). We leave
this analysis to the supplementary material.
5. Without the GP assumption
Even if our our true validation score f is not drawn from
a Gaussian process (Assumption 1), we can still guarantee
differential privacy for releasing its value after Bayesian
optimization fBO = maxt≤T f(λt). In this section we
describe a different functional assumption on f that also
yields differentially private Bayesian optimization for the
case of machine learning hyper-parameter tuning.
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Assume we have a (nonsensitive) training set T =
{(xi, yi)}ni=1, which, given a hyperparameter λ produces
a model w(λ) from the following optimization,
wλ = arg min
w
Oλ(w)︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ
2
‖w‖22 +
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(w,xi, yi), (10)
The function ` is a training loss function (e.g., logistic
loss, hinge loss). Given a (sensitive) validation set V =
{(xi, yi)}mi=1 ⊆ X we would like to use Bayesian opti-
mization to maximize a validation score fV .
Assumption 2. Our true validation score fV is
fV(w(λ)) = − 1
m
m∑
i=1
g(wλ,xi, yi),
where g(·) is a validation loss function that is L-Lipschitz
in w (e.g., ramp loss, normalized sigmoid (Huang et al.,
2014)). Additionally, the training model wλ is the mini-
mizer of eq. (10) for a training loss `(·) that is 1-Lipschitz
in w and convex (e.g., logistic loss, hinge loss).
Algorithm 3 describes a procedure for privately releasing
the best validation accuracy fBO given assumption 2. Dif-
ferent from previous algorithms, we may run Bayesian op-
timization in Algorithm 3 with any acquisition function
(e.g., expected improvement (Mockus et al., 1978), UCB)
and privacy is still guaranteed.
Algorithm 3 Private Bayesian Opt. (Lipschitz and convex)
Input: T size n; V size m; Λ; λmin; λmax; ; T ; L; d
Run Bayesian optimization for T timesteps, observing:
fV(wλ1), . . . , fV(wλT ) for {λ1, . . . , λT } = ΛT,V ⊆ Λ
fBO = maxt≤T fV(wλt)
g∗ = max(x,y)∈X ,w∈Rd g(w,x, y)
Draw θ ∼ Lap
[
1
 min{ g
∗
m ,
L
mλmin
}+ (λmax−λmin)Lλmaxλmin
]
Return: f˜L = fBO + θ
Similar to Algorithms 1 and 2 we use the Laplace mech-
anism to mask the possible change in validation accuracy
when V is swapped with a neighboring validation set V ′.
Different from the work of Chaudhuri & Vinterbo (2013)
changing V to V ′ may also lead to Bayesian optimiza-
tion searching different hyper-parameters, ΛT,V vs. ΛT,V′ .
Therefore, we must bound the total global sensitivity of f
with respect to V and λ,
Definition 5. The total global sensitivity of f over all
neighboring datasets V,V ′ is
∆f , maxV,V′⊆X
λ,λ′∈Λ
|fV(wλ)− fV′(wλ′)|.
In the following theorem we demonstrate that we can
bound the change in f for arbitrary λ < λ′.
Theorem 7. Given assumption 2, for neighboring V,V ′
and arbitrary λ < λ′ we have that,
|fV(wλ)−fV′(wλ′)| ≤ (λ
′−λ)L
λ′λ + min
{
g∗
m ,
L
mλmin
}
where L is the Lipschitz constant of f , g∗ =
max(x,y)∈X ,w∈Rd g(w,x, y), and m is the size of V .
Proof. Applying the triangle inequality yields
|fV(wλ)− fV′(wλ′)| ≤ |fV(wλ)− fV(wλ′)|
+ |fV(wλ′)− fV′(wλ′)|.
This second term is bounded by Chaudhuri & Vinterbo
(2013) in the proof of Theorem 4. The only difference is,
as we are not adding random noise to wλ′ we have that
|fV(wλ′)− fV′(wλ′)| ≤ min{g∗/m,L/(mλmin) }.
To bound the first term, let Oλ(w) be the value of the ob-
jective in eq. (10) for a particular λ. Note that Oλ(w) and
Oλ′(w) are λ and λ′-strongly convex. Define
h(w) = Oλ′(w)−Oλ(w) = λ′−λ2 ‖w‖22. (11)
Further, define the minimizers wλ=arg minw Oλ(w) and
wλ′=arg minw[Oλ(w) + h(w)]. This implies that
∇Oλ(wλ) = ∇Oλ(wλ′) +∇h(wλ) = 0. (12)
Given that Oλ is λ-strongly convex (Shalev-Shwartz,
2007), and by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
λ ‖wλ−wλ′‖22 ≤
[
∇Oλ(wλ)−∇Oλ(wλ′)
]>[
wλ−wλ′
]
≤ ∇h(wλ′)>
[
wλ−wλ′
]
≤ ‖∇h(wλ′)‖2‖wλ−wλ′‖2.
Rearranging,
1
λ
‖∇h(wλ′)‖2 =
∥∥∥λ′−λ
2
∇‖wλ′‖22
∥∥∥
2
≥ ‖wλ−wλ′‖2
(13)
Now as wλ′ is the minimizer of Oλ′ we have,
∇‖wλ′‖22 = 2λ′
[− 1n∑ni=1∇`(wλ′ ,xi, yi)].
Substituting this value of wλ′ into eq. (13) and noting that
we can pull the positive constant term (λ′−λ)/2 out of the
norm and drop the negative sign in the norm gives us
1
λ‖∇h(wλ′)‖2 = λ
′−λ
λλ′
∥∥∥ 1n∑ni=1∇`(wλ′ ,xi, yi)∥∥∥
2
= λ
′−λ
λλ′ .
The last equality follows from the fact that the loss ` is
1-Lipschitz by Assumption 2 and the triangle inequality.
Thus, along with eq. (13), we have
‖wλ−wλ′‖2 ≤ 1λ‖∇h(wλ′)‖2 ≤ λ
′−λ
λλ′ .
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Finally, as f is L-Lipschitz in w,
|fV(wλ)− fV(wλ′)| ≤ L‖wλ −wλ′‖2 ≤ Lλ′−λλλ′
Combining the result of Chaudhuri & Vinterbo (2013) with
the above expression completes the proof. 
Given a finite set of possible hyperparameters Λ, we would
like to bound |f∗V − f∗V′ |; the best validation score found
when running Bayesian optimization on V vs. V ′. Note
that, by Theorem 7,
|f∗V − f∗V′ | ≤ max
λ,λ′
|fV(wλ)−fV′(wλ′)|
≤ (λmax−λmin)Lλmaxλmin + min
{
g∗
m ,
L
mλmin
}
,
as (λ′−λ)/(λ′λ) is strictly increasing in λ′ strictly decreas-
ing in λ. Given this sensitivity of f∗ we can use the Laplace
mechanism to hide changes in the validation set as follows.
Corollary 4. Let A(V) denote Algorithm 3 applied on
dataset V . Given assumption 2, f˜L is -differentially pri-
vate, i.e., Pr
[A(V) = f˜L] ≤ e Pr[A(V ′) = f˜L]
We leave the proof to the supplementary material. Further,
by the exponential tails of the Laplace mechanism we have
the following utility guarantee,
Theorem 8. Given the assumptions of Theorem 7, we have
the following utility guarantee for f˜L w.r.t. fBO,
|f˜L − fBO| ≤ a
[
1
m min{g∗, Lλmin }+
(λmax−λmin)L
λmaxλmin
]
with probability at least 1− e−a.
Proof. This follows exactly from the tail bound on Laplace
random variables, given in the beginning of the proof of
Theorem 6. 
6. Results
In this section we examine the validity of our multi-task
Gaussian process assumption on [f1, . . . , f2|X| ]. Specifi-
cally, we search for the most likely value of the multi-task
Gaussian process covariance element k1(V,V ′), for clas-
sifier hyper-parameter tuning. Larger values of k1(V,V ′)
correspond to a smaller global sensitivity bounds in Theo-
rems 1, 3, and 5 leading to improved privacy guarantees.
For our setting of hyper-parameter tuning, each λ = [C, γ2]
are hyper-parameters for training a kernelized support vec-
tor machine (SVM) (Cortes & Vapnik, 1995; Scho¨lkopf &
Smola, 2001) with cost parameter C and radial basis ker-
nel width γ2. The value fV(λ) is the accuracy of the SVM
model trained with hyper-parameters λ on V .
To search for the most likely k1(V,V ′) we start by
sampling 100 different SVM hyper-parameter settings
λ1, . . . , λ100 from a Sobol sequence and train an SVM
model for each on the Forest UCI dataset (36, 603 train-
ing inputs). We then randomly sample 100 i.i.d. valida-
tion sets V . Here we describe the evaluation procedure for
a fixed validation set size, which corresponds to a single
curve in Figure 1 (as such, to generate all results we re-
peat this procedure for each validation set size in the set
{1000, 2000, 3000, 5000, 15000}). For each of the 100 val-
idation sets we randomly add or remove an input to form
a neighboring dataset V ′. We then evaluate each of the
trained SVM models on all 100 datasets V and their pairs
V ′. This results in two 100 × 100 (number of datasets,
number of trained SVM models) function evaluation matri-
ces FV and FV′ . Thus, [FV ]ij is the validation accuracy on
the ith validation set Vi using the jth SVM model.
The likelihood of function evaluations for a dataset pair
(Vi,V ′i), for a value of k1(Vi,V ′i), is given by the marginal
likelihood of the multi-task Gaussian process:
Pr
(
[FV ]i
[FV′ ]i
)
∼ N (µ100, σ2100), (14)
where [FV ]i = [fV(λ1), . . . , fV(λ100)] (similarly for V ′)
and µ100 and σ2100 are the posterior mean and variance of
the multi-task Gaussian process using kernel k1(V,V ′) ⊗
k2(λ, λ
′) after observing [FV ]i and [FV′ ]i (for more details
see Bonilla et al. (2008)). As µ100 and σ2100 depend on
k1(V,V ′), we treat it as a free-parameter and vary its value
from 0.05 to 0.95 in increments of 0.05. For each value,
we compute the marginal likelihood (14) for all validation
datasets (Vi for i = 1, . . . , 100). As each Vi is sampled
i.i.d. the joint marginal likelihood is simply the product of
all Vi likelihoods. Computing this joint marginal likelihood
for each k1(V,V ′) value yields a single curve of Figure 1.
As shown, the largest values of k1(V,V ′) = 0.95 is most
likely, meaning that c in the global sensitivity bounds is
quite small, leading to private values that are closer to their
true optimums.
7. Related work
There has been much work towards differentially pri-
vate convex optimization (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer
et al., 2012; Duchi et al., 2013; Song et al., 2013; Jain &
Thakurta, 2014; Bassily et al., 2014). The work of Bass-
ily et al. (2014) established upper and lower bounds for
the excess empirical risk of  and (, δ)-differentially pri-
vate algorithms for many settings including convex and
strongly convex risk functions that may or may not be
smooth. There is also related work towards private high-
dimensional regression, where the dimensions outnum-
ber the number of instances (Kifer et al., 2012; Smith &
Thakurta, 2013a). In such cases the Hessian becomes sin-
gular and so the loss is nonconvex. However, it is possible
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Figure 1. The log likelihood of a multi-task Gaussian process for
different values of the kernel value k1(V,V ′). The function eval-
uations are the validation accuracy of SVMs with different hyper-
parameters.
to use the restricted strong convexity of the loss in the re-
gression case to guarantee privacy.
Differential privacy has been shown to be achievable in
online and interactive kernel learning settings (Jain et al.,
2012; Smith & Thakurta, 2013b; Jain & Thakurta, 2013;
Mishra & Thakurta, 2014). In general, non-private online
algorithms are closest in spirit to the methods of Bayesian
optimization. However, all of the previous work in dif-
ferentially private online learning represents a dataset as
a sequence of bandit arm pulls (the equivalent notion in
Bayesian optimization is function evaluations f(xt)). In-
stead, we consider functions in which changing a single
dataset entry possibly affects all future function evalua-
tions. Closest to our work is that of Chaudhuri & Vin-
terbo (2013), who show that given a fixed set of hyper-
parameters which are always evaluated for any validation
set, they can return a private version of the index of the best
hyper-parameter, as well as a private model trained with
that hyper-parameter. Our setting is strictly more general
in that, if the validation set changes, Bayesian optimization
could search completely different hyper-parameters.
Bayesian optimization, largely due to its principled han-
dling of the exploration/exploitation trade-off of global,
black-box function optimization, is quickly becoming
the global optimization paradigm of choice. Alongside
promising empirical results there is a wealth of recent
work on convergence guarantees for Bayesian optimiza-
tion, similar to those used in this work (Srinivas et al.,
2010; de Freitas et al., 2012). Vazquez & Bect (2010) and
Bull (2011) give regret bounds for optimizing the expected
improvement acquisition function each optimization step.
BayesGap (Hoffman et al., 2014) gives a convergence guar-
antee for Bayesian optimization with budget constraints.
Bayesian optimization has also been extended to multi-task
optimization (Bardenet et al., 2013; Swersky et al., 2013),
the setting where multiple experiments can be run at once
(Azimi et al., 2012; Snoek et al., 2012), and to constrained
optimization (Gardner et al., 2014).
8. Conclusion
We have introduced methods for privately releasing the
best hyper-parameters and validation accuracies in the case
of exact and noisy observations. Our work makes use
of the differential privacy framework, which has become
commonplace in private machine learning (Dwork & Roth,
2013). We believe we are the first to demonstrate differen-
tially private quantities in the setting of global optimization
of expensive (possibly nonconvex) functions, through the
lens of Bayesian optimization.
One key future direction is to design techniques to release
each sampled hyper-parameter and validation accuracy pri-
vately (during the run of Bayesian optimization). This
requires analyzing how the maximum upper-confidence
bound changes as the validation dataset changes. Another
interesting direction is extending our guarantees in Sections
3 and 4 to other acquisition functions.
For the case of machine learning hyper-parameter tuning
our results are designed to guarantee privacy of the valida-
tion set only (it is equivalent to guarantee that the training
set is never allowed to change). To simultaneously protect
the privacy of the training set it may be possible to use tech-
niques similar to the training stability results of Chaudhuri
& Vinterbo (2013). Training stability could be guaranteed,
for example, by assuming an additional training set kernel
that bounds the effect of altering the training set on f . We
leave developing these guarantees for future work.
As practitioners begin to use Bayesian optimization in
practical settings involving sensitive data, it suddenly be-
comes crucial to consider how to preserve data privacy
while reporting accurate Bayesian optimization results.
This work presents methods to achieve such privacy, which
we hope will be useful to practitioners and theorists alike.
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